From deposition testimony for a TSA Screener's alleged use of excessive force during a TSA pat-down.

Despite MICHAEL GERARD POLSON of Odenton, Maryland having been ARRESTED on 10 March 2016 at Dulles Airport for FELONY SEXUAL BATTERY during a TSA pat-down on an off-duty pilot, Polson was HIRED by the US Secret Service around September 2016. Polson claims that he told USSS of his arrest, but the Secret Service denies knowing about it. Polson claims that neither TSA nor Secret Service has investigated Polson's arrest Date of deposition 20 Oct 2017 for felony sexual battery.

("SOP" refers to TSA's Standard Operating Procedures Manual for Checkpoints)

- Q Have you ever been guided by TSA to be careful not to use excessive striking force as it has been defined?
- A I don't recall
- Q Do TSA regulations permit use of excessive force in passenger pat downs?
- A Again, I do not recall any specific regulations on excessive force being taught in training or provided in SOP.
- Q Do you think that your role as a TSO granted you special immunities? A No.

(and further in the deposition):

- Q So based on that definition, is there a striking force of one object coming in contact with another as you slide your hand up from the thigh to the groin and genitals?
- A I would agree there is.
- Q Okay. Based upon the definition, what amount of striking force is reasonable?
- A Only enough to properly ascertain that the area is clear for SOP.
- Q Does SOP define a reasonable amount of striking force in this situation? A Not to my knowledge.
- Q How do you know what a reasonable amount of striking force is if it's not defined?
- A When I can tell the difference between the leg and the torso.
- Q Isn't it possible that the striking force could injure a passenger?
- A By your definition of striking --
- MR. SYLVERTOOTH (attorney for Polson): Form.
- A By your definition of striking force being any contact period between two different things, there are all sorts of things that can be considered excessive to that fact.
- Q Have you ever heard of such a striking force injuring a passenger?
- A I have not.
- Q Have you ever been guided by TSA to be careful not to use excessive striking force as it has been defined?
- A I don't recall.

In Plaintiff's review of all of Defendant's and TSA's production, NO WHERE are excessive force standards or authorization to use a striking motion ever authorized during passenger pat-downs. Furthermore, TSA's withholding of Excessive Force Guidance has irreparably harmed Plaintiff's case, since this impacted Rule 26 production, Defendant and TSA and Whetsell's Subpoena production, and Defendant's and Whetsell's deposition questioning. Even if TSA were to produce the limited and not-confirmed-as-SSI excessive force guidelines at this late stage, Plaintiff contends that Defendant's (and 3rd parties') access and use of alleged SSI, while withholding it from Plaintiff, is itself mortally prejudicial to this case, such that dispositive sanctions should be GRANTED in favor of Plaintiff.

- 1. TSA has notably not complied (as of 19 January 2018) with two Orders of this Court to provide any such excessive force guidance to Plaintiff, and is the subject of Plaintiff's motions for indirect civil contempt and to show cause for why sanctions are not appropriate.
- 2. Notable for this reply to any potential Defense summary judgment motion, is that TSA has also <u>instructed</u>

 <u>Defendant not to provide or amend</u> his Rule 26 and other testimony/evidenciary responses to Plaintiff, making TSA's actions <u>criminal</u> violations of 18 USC§1509, for threatening Defendant for failure to amend or supplement his answers with the redacted material replaced with unredacted alleged SSI.
- 3. Plaintiff has already cited Graham v. Connor in Plaintiff's summary judgment motion, and pointed out that since no exigency existed, and Defendant and his supervisors all laughed and claimed that their actions were intentional and could not be prosecuted, that Defendant's unreasonable refusal to simply apologize (as asked at least times to Defendant, plus to the TSA chief Johnson), imply and validate a level of unreasonable and abnormal conduct by TSA, where a reasonable agent would have apologized, and never used a striking force in the first place!

The following pages are relevant portions of Chapters 2 and 4 of TSA's SOP (Standard Operating Procedures) from 2008.

Government workers preparing the release of a Transportation Security Administration manual that details airport screening procedures badly bungled their redaction of the .pdf file. Result: The full text of a document considered "sensitive security information" was inadvertently leaked and posted official by TSA on the internet. This is a subpart of that posting, since only chapter 4 is relevant to TSA pat-downs.

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Screening Management SOP

AVIATION SECURITY

SCREENING MANAGEMENT STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES



Transportation Security Administration (TSA) personnel and contractors must use and implement these standard operating procedures in carrying out their functions related to security screening of passengers, accessible property and checked baggage. Nothing in these procedures is intended to create any substantive or procedural rights, privileges, or benefits enforceable in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter by prospective or actual witnesses or parties. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979).

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Chapter

2. PERSONNEL STAFFING, DUTIES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. STAFFING

- A. Staffing will vary depending on the volume of passenger traffic, airport size, and peak hour demand. The following are staffing guidelines to meet peak hour demand. TSA bases all procedures in the Screening Checkpoint and Checked Baggage Screening SOPs on availability of a TSO assigned to perform each of the following duties. However, the following list of duties must not be interpreted to be the minimum screening location staffing model:
 - 1) X-ray screening of accessible property
 - 2) Hand Held Metal Detector (HHMD) and pat-down screening of individuals
 - 3) Walk Through Metal Detector (WTMD) screening of individuals
 - 4) Explosive Trace Portal (ETP) screening of individuals
 - 5) Exit lane monitoring, if the exit lane is co-located with the screening checkpoint
 - 6) Physical, ETD, or Liquid Container Screening (LCS) of accessible property and checked baggage
 - 7) EDS screening of checked baggage
 - 8) Travel document checking
- B. Screening checkpoint staffing requirements:
 - 1) One TSO designated as LTSO for every two screening lanes
 - 2) Each checkpoint must also include at least one STSO
- C. Checked baggage staffing requirements:
 - 1) EDS Collocated with One ETD: One EDS TSO, two ETD TSOs, and a sufficient number of STSOs in the immediate area to respond when called by the TSOs. An ETD TSO may be used as a baggage handler to load baggage into an EDS. If staff is available beyond this requirement, a dedicated baggage handler may optimize throughput.
 - 2) ETD Stand Alone: A minimum of one and a maximum of two TSOs per ETD (sampling different checked baggage, but using the same ETD) and one STSO for every six ETD systems.
 - 3) EDS Collocated with Multiple ETDs: For each EDS, one EDS TSO. For each ETD, two ETD TSOs and a sufficient number of STSOs in the immediate area to respond when called by the TSOs.
- D. TSA management or an STSO may choose to assign additional TSOs to the screening location. TSA management may also assign additional personnel (who may or may not be qualified TSOs) to non-screening positions such as line monitors and bin loaders.
- E. FSDs have the discretion to deviate from these guidelines as long as there is a minimum of one EDS TSO and one ETD TSO at EDS equipped screening locations and a minimum of one ETD TSO at ETD Stand Alone screening locations.
- F. Staffing for special consideration screening must be a minimum of two TSOs at the appropriate screening location determined by the FSD.

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G. Individuals performing the duties of TSOs, LTSOs, or STSOs must be in uniform and trained to the required level before performing screening duties or making operational screening decisions. All training must be conducted in accordance with TSA established requirements and current directives that affect training.

2.2. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OFFICER (TSO) DUTIES

- A. The screening functions are:
 - 1) X-ray screening of accessible property
 - Physical, ETD, or LCS screening of accessible property and Physical or ETD screening of checked baggage
 - 3) HHMD and pat-down screening of individuals
 - 4) WTMD screening of individuals
 - 5) ETP screening of individuals
 - 6) Exit Lane Monitor
 - 7) EDS screening of checked baggage
 - 8) Travel document checking
- B. Except for the TDC and Exit Lane Monitor, all screening personnel including STSOs must be able to perform each screening function. However, TSOs must perform only those functions to which they are assigned at that moment. TSOs must be rotated through each different screening function throughout their shift in order to promote effective, vigilant, and courteous screening. During continuous screening operations, STSOs and LTSOs are encouraged to rotate TSOs to a new position at no more than 30 minute intervals. A TSO may also be assigned duty as an exit lane monitor at co-located exit lanes or as a line monitor or bin loader.
- C. TSOs must report work-related injuries or illnesses to their STSO. TSOs must report any observed unsafe or unhealthful working conditions or practices to their STSO. The TSO or STSO making the report must complete TSA Form 2400, Employee Report of Unsafe and/or Unhealthful Working Conditions. TSA Management Directive 2400.4 contains instructions for completing this form.

2.2.1. X-RAY EXAMINATION OF ACCESSIBLE PROPERTY

The X-ray operator is responsible for screening accessible property using an x-ray system in accordance with the Screening Checkpoint SOP.

2.2.2. PHYSICAL SEARCH, ETD INSPECTION, OR LCS OF PROPERTY

The property search TSO is responsible for screening accessible property and checked baggage by physical search, ETD inspection, and/or LCS in accordance with the Screening Checkpoint and Checked Baggage Screening SOPs.

2.2.3. HHMD OR PAT-DOWN SCREENING OF INDIVIDUALS

The HHMD TSO is responsible for HHMD screening and pat-down inspections in accordance with the Screening Checkpoint SOP. All HHMD and pat-down searches must be conducted by TSOs of the same gender as the individual presents him or herself to be. Extraordinary circumstances may occur where a TSO of the same gender is not available, including staffing shortage emergencies at any airport or limited staffing at category II, III, and IV airports. Under these circumstances, TSOs of the opposite gender may be allowed to screen individuals in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 4.3.14 of this SOP. During opposite gender screening an STSO or LTSO, if possible, should be present. This rule applies to all references of same gender screening in the Screening Checkpoint SOP.

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2.2.4. WTMD SCREENING OF INDIVIDUALS

The WTMD TSO monitors individuals passing through the WTMD. When necessary, the WTMD TSO must perform certain limited same gender pat-downs as specified in the Screening Checkpoint SOP and/or refer individuals for additional screening.

2.2.5. ETP SCREENING OF INDIVIDUALS

The ETP TSO monitors individuals passing through the ETP. When necessary, the ETP TSO must refer individuals for additional screening.

2.2.6. EXIT LANE MONITOR

Where TSA has assumed responsibility for an exit lane, the exit lane monitor must report unauthorized sterile area access to an STSO. The exit lane monitor is not required to be TSO certified. However, exit lane monitors who are not certified as **TDC** must not be permitted to verify credentials of individuals requesting specialized screening and must notify a TSA representative to perform specialized screening procedures. When the exit lane monitor is **TDC** certified, he or she is permitted to verify credentials and must use lights and loupes during identification (ID) verification. FSDs may determine whether exit lane monitors must sit or stand while on duty.

2.2.7. EDS SCREENING OF CHECKED BAGGAGE

The EDS operator is responsible for screening checked baggage using an EDS in accordance with the Checked Baggage Screening SOP. Only EDS operators who have successfully completed On-Screen Alarm Resolution Protocol (OSARP) training may perform OSARP procedures. All other EDS operators must use the non-OSARP EDS procedures. Locations where screening personnel are properly trained and certified on the use of EDS OSARP must use the OSARP to resolve EDS alarms.

2.2.8. TRAVEL DOCUMENT CHECKER (TDC)

The TDC is responsible for checking all travel documents, gate passes, and IDs of individuals desiring access to the screening checkpoint. The TDC is not required to be certified to perform all TSO duties; however, the TDC must have completed all mandatory TDC training prior to assuming the TDC role.

2.3. LEAD TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OFFICER (LTSO) DUTIES

In addition to the functions and duties of a TSO, an LTSO may perform the functions and duties marked with an asterisk in Section 2.4. of this SOP when assigned by the STSO. When the STSO is absent from the screening location or an LTSO is appointed an acting STSO, the LTSO may perform all of the functions and duties in Section 2.4. of this SOP.

2.4. SUPERVISORY TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OFFICER (STSO) DUTIES

A. The STSO is responsible for implementing the uniform performance standards for security screening services set forth in this SOP, and the Screening Checkpoint and Checked Baggage Screening SOPs at all screening locations. STSOs must be knowledgeable in all the screening functions they supervise. An STSO must be present at each screening location that is open for operation. However, an STSO's absence from the checkpoint is excused for break periods and unforeseen situations requiring an STSO's absence. If the STSO must be absent during routine operation of a screening location, he or she must designate an LTSO to act on his or her behalf and must advise the designated LTSO of his or her whereabouts. FSDs may designate and schedule LTSOs to act as STSOs if temporary operational requirements cannot accommodate assignment of an STSO to each shift.

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B. The STSO must not routinely conduct EDS screening, x-ray screening, LCS, travel document checking, operate an ETD, load bags on the x-ray system conveyor, physically inspect accessible property or checked baggage, control the exit lane, or be responsible for the operation of the WTMDs, HHMDs, and ETPs. However, STSOs are strongly encouraged to perform TSO duties on a limited basis in order to maintain their screening skills and currency. At Category III and IV airports, STSOs may routinely conduct screening per the Screening Checkpoint and Checked Baggage Screening SOPs, if necessary, due to staffing requirements.

C. The STSO must:

- 1) *Resolve situations concerning Possible Threat items to determine whether the items are permitted onboard the aircraft.
- 2) *Observe TSOs, when staffing and workload permit, to ensure compliance with the Screening Checkpoint and Checked Baggage Screening SOPs.
- 3) Ensure the proper use of all screening equipment.
- 4) Make every effort to maintain proper staffing levels at each screening location.
- 5) Conduct daily briefings and instruct TSOs on current requirements.
- 6) Ensure the SOP and other required documents are accessible to TSOs for their review.
- 7) *Perform or ensure pre-operational safety checks are completed.
- 8) Make every effort to ensure that TSOs are knowledgeable of all SOPs.
- Allow TSOs to review the SOPs.
- 10) Ensure that TSOs are fit for duty in accordance with TSA Management Directive 1100.73-5, Employee Responsibilities and Conduct.
- 11) *Rotate TSOs through the screening duties for which they are qualified.
- 12) Designate an LTSO for the screening location in his or her absence.
- 13) Ensure TSOs do not handle explosives, incendiaries, or weapons if such items are discovered during the screening process.
- 14) Complete administrative duties at the screening locations as designated by the FSD.
- 15) *Make every effort to actively monitor all screening activities and intervene to resolve alarms in any of the functions performed by TSOs to ensure effective, vigilant, and courteous screening.
- 16) Notify a Bomb Appraisal Officer (BAO) or an LEO when necessary.
- 17) *Ensure that TSA NOI cards are properly used and controlled. Report any suspected loss or theft of these items to the TSM immediately upon discovery.
- 18) Ensure that TSOs wear appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in accordance with the provisions of this SOP.
- 19) Represent TSA in handling complaints, respond to TSA security reviews, and immediately notify TSA management about incidents.
- 20) Provide a written summary of any incident to TSA management as soon as possible, but not to exceed 24 hours after the incident or as directed by the FSD.
- 21) Make every effort to resolve problems or conflicts and monitor individuals when appropriate, without using physical restraint and without jeopardizing the safety of the STSO, TSOs, the individual, or others.

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22) Manage incidents as they arise until the arrival of an LEO, including the collection of witness information (for example, name, contact information, and statement regarding the incident) and retention of evidence.

- 23) If designated by the FSD, inspect the credentials of LEOs, LEOs escorting prisoners, Federal Flight Deck Officers (FFDOs), Federal Air Marshals (FAMs), credentialed TSA employees flying with a working canine, and U.S. Government employees required to fly armed in order to clear them through the screening checkpoint. Use travel document checking lights and loupes while inspecting the credentials.
- 24) Maintain the checkpoint logbook.
- 25) Ensure that TSOs using an x-ray system equipped with Threat Image Projection (TIP) capability logon and log-off using their assigned ID numbers and passwords at the beginning and end of each duty cycle.
- 26) Ensure daily operational testing of screening equipment occurs at designated intervals.
- 27) Ensure that calibrations of the WTMD occur at designated intervals.
- 28) Ensure testing of LCS equipment occurs prior to use and at designated intervals.
- 29) Ensure that a daily Image Quality Test (IQT) is performed for EDS.
- 30) Ensure that calibration/verification of the ETD is performed, shift maintenance is performed, and adequate supplies are available at the beginning of each shift and every eight hours thereafter.
- 31) Ensure that calibration and verification of the ETP is performed at the beginning of each shift and every eight hours thereafter.
- 32) Ensure that travel document checking equipment is operational.
- 33) Immediately contact an aircraft operator representative when necessary.
- 34) Ensure that communications equipment is located at all screening locations and immediately notify the LEO and TSA management if communications equipment is not working. This equipment must be tested daily and results must be recorded.
- 35) Ensure that all required signs are posted at each screening location.
- 36) *Complete tasks required to open and close a screening location.
- 37) Ensure chairs are available at checkpoints to accommodate Persons With disabilities (PWDs) before, during, and after the screening process.
- 38) Ensure that the screening of all individuals is conducted without regard to a person's race, color, national origin, gender, disability, religion, parental status, or sexual orientation.
- 39) Collect currency and review claims for currency left at the screening checkpoint per local procedures.
- 40) Conduct inquiries related to an employee injury or illness incurred in the workplace, or an employee report of an unsafe/unhealthful working condition and document the inquiry on TSA Form 2401 using TSA Management Directives 2400.4 and 2400.5. FSDs must establish local procedures on how to conduct inquiries related to employee injuries or illness.
- 41) Ensure TSOs provide only their TSA nametag information when an individual requests a TSO's personal information during, or as a result of, the screening process.
- 42) Conduct the procedures for checking travel documents and notifying the LEO and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), when applicable, when U.S. currency or other monetary instruments appearing to exceed \$10,000 is found on an individual or their property during screening.

^{*}Indicates those duties that may be performed by an LTSO when assigned by an STSO.

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2.5. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER (LEO) AND BOMB APPRAISAL OFFICER (BAO) NOTIFICATION

- A. Notify an LEO when the STSO:
 - 1) Is unable to resolve an alarm in accordance with TSA SOPs.
 - 2) Discovers an asterisked (*) item on the TSA Prohibited Items List.
 - 3) Discovers a prohibited item that is artfully concealed.
 - 4) Determines that additional LEO notifications are required as directed by this SOP.
 - 5) If an individual assaults, threatens, intimidates, or otherwise interferes with TSO personnel performing screening duties.
 - 6) Discovers fraudulent or potentially fraudulent identification or travel documents.
- B. If an STSO believes an alarm may be caused by an IED, explosives, or IED components, he/she must first notify a BAO (if available). Notification must be accomplished as discreetly as possible.
- C. When an LEO is notified, an individual and/or property must not be allowed into the sterile area or onboard an aircraft until the FSD or his or her designee has reviewed the LEO's actions and authorized the individual to continue the screening process or proceed into the sterile area. When the LEO response is for a fraudulent ID, the FSD does not have to review the LEO's actions.

2.6. GUIDELINES FOR MARKING CHECKED BAGGAGE

- A. At those airports where cleared and uncleared checked bags are mixed together within the baggage handling system, the FSD must implement a process that allows TSOs to readily identify cleared bags.
- B. At those airports where cleared and uncleared checked bags are not mixed together within the baggage handling system, the FSD must review airport baggage screening and handling processes and determine what means, if any, are necessary for ensuring that all checked bags are screened and cleared for transport.
- C. FSDs must coordinate their local procedures for marking bags with local aircraft operators and other stakeholders.

2.7. PHOTOGRAPHING, VIDEOTAPING, AND FILMING SCREENING LOCATIONS

- A. TSA does not prohibit the public, passengers, or press from photographing, videotaping, or filming screening locations unless the activity interferes with a TSO's ability to perform his or her duties or prevents the orderly flow of individuals through the screening location. Requests by commercial entities to photograph an airport screening location must be forwarded to TSA's Office of Strategic Communications and Public Affairs. Photographing EDS or ETD monitor screens or emitted images is not permitted.
- B. TSA must not confiscate or destroy the photographic equipment or film of any person photographing the screening location.
- C. Whenever possible, x-ray machine images must not be visible to the public or press. When physical constraints prevent x-ray images from being fully protected from public viewing, TSOs must ensure no member of the public or press is in a position to observe an x-ray monitor for an extended period of time. Passengers and other unauthorized individuals must not be allowed to view EDS or ETD monitors and screens.

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D. In addition to this policy, local laws, State statutes, or local ordinances may prohibit photographing, videotaping, or filming screening locations. TSA **management** must **ensure that TSOs** are familiar with these State or local laws. However, State and local authorities must enforce such laws. TSOs must alert an LEO to individuals who may be violating these State or local laws, but must not confront these individuals.

2.8. PRIVATE SCREENING AREA

- A. The private screening area must be a separate room or an area shielded by curtains or another mechanism adjacent to the checkpoint to prevent the public from seeing into the area.
- B. If possible, the private screening area should be inside the sterile area. If the private screening area is not in the sterile area, the individual and his or her property must remain under the escort of a TSO from the time screening begins until entry into the sterile area (or aircraft, if there is no sterile area).

2.9. STERILE AREA

A sterile area is established by ensuring that no prohibited items or unauthorized individuals are within the area. Once a sterile area is established, the following requirements must be met:

- A. TSA controls access to the sterile area at the screening checkpoint and at exit lanes monitored by TSA. The airport operator and aircraft operators control other access points.
- B. All individuals and property entering the sterile area through the screening checkpoint must be screened to prevent the unauthorized introduction of prohibited items. Screening is accomplished by inspecting for explosives, incendiaries, or weapons (referred to as prohibited items) or by specialized and alternative screening in Chapter 4 of this SOP.
- C. Any individual who has been screened and enters a sterile area, and then exits the sterile area into a public area for any reason must be screened prior to reentry into the sterile area.
- D. FSDs must develop local security breach control procedures in accordance with TSA Operations Directive OD-400-50-5-3. TSOs must familiarize themselves with local security breach control procedures as developed by the FSD. TSOs must inform the STSO if they observe any activity while on duty at the screening checkpoint or in and around the airport environment that qualifies as a security breach or access event as defined in the FSD's local procedures.
- E. A sterile area must be thoroughly inspected and cleared of unauthorized individuals and prohibited items following a period of TSA non-control or after an uncontrolled security breach.

2.10. INDIVIDUALS AUTHORIZED ACCESS INTO THE STERILE AREA

TSA limits the individuals who may access the sterile area of an airport via the screening checkpoint and determines to what extent certain individuals are screened. All individuals seeking access to the sterile area must undergo screening, including individuals specifically identified for specialized and alternative screening procedures in Chapter 4 of this SOP. TSA security programs and directives permit the following individuals access to the screening checkpoint:

- A. Ticketed passengers
- B. Standby passengers with a valid travel authorization
- C. Aircraft operator employees presenting valid aircraft operator ID
- D. Airport and aircraft operator employees who have been issued an airport ID card
- E. Airport and aircraft operator employees presenting valid airport security identification display area access card

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Chapter

4. SPECIALIZED AND ALTERNATIVE SCREENING PROCEDURES

All individuals, accessible property, and checked baggage must undergo screening as described in this SOP, the Checked Baggage and the Screening Checkpoint SOPs unless the TSO identifies an individual and/or property as eligible for specialized screening, checked baggage alternative screening, or a Government official requests a screening exemption. When specialized screening is required, the STSO must ensure that the identification requirements and screening procedures in this chapter are followed.

4.1. DIPLOMATIC POUCHES

- A. Diplomatic pouches are exempt from any form of screening. A diplomatic pouch can be a bag, pouch, or container holding diplomatic correspondence, documents, or articles. Although an individual transporting a diplomatic pouch may have diplomatic immunity, that individual and his or her non-diplomatic accessible property and checked baggage must undergo screening and all alarms must be resolved.
- B. The diplomatic pouch must have visible external markings in English that state "Diplomatic Pouch" or "Diplomatic Bag". The pouch must bear an official seal of the sending government or international organization. For example, a seal could be a lead seal attached to a tie that closes the pouch, a printed seal on the fabric of the pouch, or an ink seal impressed on a detachable tag. The pouch must be addressed to an office of the government or international organization whose seal the pouch bears. For unaccompanied pouches tendered as checked baggage, a detachable certificate will be affixed to the outside of the pouch that describes the pouch and certifies the contents as diplomatic materials. The Department of State (DOS) encourages diplomatic couriers to notify the aircraft operator that they are carrying a diplomatic pouch.
- C. When a diplomatic pouch is presented by a diplomatic courier to TSA at a screening checkpoint or screening location, the STSO must check that the diplomatic courier is carrying an official or diplomatic passport and a courier document or letter on their person for identification. A courier letter must be on appropriate letterhead stationary and must bear a seal of the sending state, embassy, consulate, or international organization. The courier letter must be signed by the relevant Ambassador or Chief of Mission serving in the United States. The courier document must clearly identify the bearer and his or her status as a diplomatic courier and must contain information sufficient to identify the pouch(es), to include the number of pouches being escorted.
- D. After clearing the required documentation listed in paragraph C., the STSO must ensure the diplomatic pouch is not submitted for screening. Improperly documented pouches or pouches without the required external markings must not be opened, must not be allowed into the sterile area, and must be returned to the courier.
- E. If a diplomatic pouch is inadvertently presented for screening **or is discovered during** the screening process:
 - 1) At the screening checkpoint, a TSO must not open the pouch. The TSO must notify an STSO who must contact the diplomatic courier and verify the courier's documents. After the documents are verified, the diplomatic pouch is exempt from further screening.
 - 2) At the checked baggage screening location, a TSO must not open the pouch. The TSO must notify an STSO who must ensure no further screening is conducted on the pouch. The STSO must:
 - a. Not mark the pouch with any TSA-specific indicator.

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b. Place the pouch beyond all TSA checked baggage screening systems (EDS and ETD).

- 3) Diplomatic pouches that are inadvertently submitted for screening and that alarm (either accessible property or checked baggage) must be denied access to the sterile or secured area and returned by the STSO to the diplomatic courier or aircraft operator without any further screening. If required, notify an LEO/BAO for items that alarmed the screening system.
- F. Incidents involving submission for screening or inadvertent screening of diplomatic pouches must be immediately reported to the FSD or his or her designee.

4.2. CHECKPOINT SCREENING DOCUMENTATION

4.2.1. INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENT REQUIREMENTS

The procedures in this chapter require an individual to establish his or her eligibility for specialized screening procedures by producing identification documentation. The STSO must ensure that required identification documentation is validated as specified in this chapter prior to clearing the individual into the sterile area.

- A. Authorization to Inspect Identification
 - 1) An airport-assigned LEO (if available), **STSO**, or TSA representative designated by an FSD is authorized to verify **the required identification of the following individuals**; LEOs, **FAMs**, Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), National Security Agency (NSA), and **Central Intelligence Agency Protective Operations Division (CIA POD)** personnel, FFDOs, armed security guards, and **TSA employees flying with a working canine.**
 - 2) An STSO or TSA representative designated by an FSD is authorized to verify the required identification of the following individuals: TSA screening personnel, TSA credentialed employees, aircraft operator flight crew, CIA Worldwide Operational Meet and Assist Program (WOMAP) personnel, Office of Foreign Missions Interagency Liaison Group (OFLMILG) Agents, U.S. Classified Document Couriers, and U.S. or Foreign Diplomatic Pouch Couriers.
- B. Types of Identification

The following is a list and description of each type of identification or documentation that individuals must present when requesting specialized screening procedures:

- 1) Badge and Credential: The credential must contain a clear full-face picture, the signature of the individual, and either the signature of the authorizing official of the agency, service, or department or the official seal of the agency or department. A badge, shield, or other similar device must not be used or accepted as the sole means of ID. A badge or credential annotated with the word "retired" is NOT valid for purposes of specialized screening as provided for in Section 4.3.1. of this SOP. Except as noted, the badge (or "shield") must be checked to ensure the name of the agency, service, or department matches that of the credential presented, and both must match the agency, service, or department listed on any other document that is presented as part of the process. An exception to this requirement is granted to LEOs flying armed in support of the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). Agency, service, or department information on the LEO's JTTF credential need not match similar information on the LEO's badge.
- 2) Official Government agency ID: A photo identification must bear the represented agency, service, or department official seal and match the agency, service, or department listed on any other document that is presented as part of the process (for example, a courier letter). The TSA employee ID card or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employee ID card are examples of an official Government agency ID.
- 3) Government-issued photo ID: Examples of these IDs include passports, driver's licenses, state-issued identity cards, official Government agency ID, and Resident Alien Cards. Refer to Section 2A-4. of this SOP for additional acceptable Government-issued photo IDs.

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4) Local airport ID card: The ID issued to personnel who have access privileges at the airport. It may vary in color and style depending on the type of access it grants at the airport. Personnel charged with verifying identification must be able to recognize all local airport ID media that grant access to the screening checkpoint. If a distinctive local airport ID or a modified version of the airport ID that signifies unescorted access privileges to armed LEOs is issued to armed Federal, State, or local LEOs, the ID used for this purpose must have a permanent, readily visible, and unique design element. Removable stickers or adhesive designs must not be used.

- 5) Company badge and credential: The type and characteristics of these forms of ID will vary depending on the employer. TSA personnel must ensure that the badge, credential, and insignia on the individual's uniform all match.
- 6) Aircraft operator ID card: The type and characteristics of these forms of identification will vary depending on the employer and the task assigned to the employee. TSA personnel must ensure that the photo on the ID matches the individual presenting the ID.
- 7) Notice of LEO flying armed document: This document acknowledges that the armed LEO has aircraft operator concurrence to fly armed. The specific name of the form and characteristics of the document will vary depending on the aircraft operator.

4.2.2. CHECKPOINT SIGN-IN LOGBOOK

Using TSA Form 413A (Checkpoint Sign-In/LEO Log, located on the TSA Intranet Forms page), the STSO must maintain a logbook at the screening checkpoint that provides a written record of those individuals who are provided specialized screening. Any logbook entry must be retained at the airport under the control of the FSD for at least 30 days. FSDs are authorized to extend this retention period as required.

- A. Logbook entries must be completed by either the individual, an airport assigned LEO, an STSO, or a designated TSA representative. When an airport assigned LEO, STSO, or designated TSA representative completes the entry, he or she must have the exempted individual confirm and sign the logbook.
- B. The logbook entry requirement does not apply to **FAMs** and FAM team augmentees.
- C. The following individuals must complete the applicable sections of the logbook:
 - 1) An LEO flying armed
 - 2) An unarmed LEO or credentialed TSA employee flying with a working canine and requesting specialized screening
 - 3) A DOS employee escorting dignitaries
 - 4) An armed security guard requesting specialized screening
- D. The logbook entry requirement does not apply to those armed Federal, State, or local LEOs at airports where the airport operator has chosen to issue either a distinctive airport ID or a modified version of the airport ID that signifies unescorted access privileges to armed LEOs. If the LEO is flying armed, he or she must complete a logbook entry. Either an STSO or TSO may inspect the LEO's distinctive or modified airport ID.
- E. If requested by a law enforcement agency, the FSD may authorize completion of the logbook entry requirement for armed LEOs and their prisoners or escortees at an airport location other than the screening checkpoint (for example, a VIP lounge or TSA offices) in order to ensure the security of a protectee and/or facilitate the movement of the protectee through the screening checkpoint.

4.3. SPECIALIZED CHECKPOINT SCREENING PROCEDURES

This section, in conjunction with Attachments 4-1 and 4-2, lists those individuals and property eligible for specialized screening. It also describes the type of identification and/or documentation the individuals must present and to what extent they are to be screened. If at any time during the screening process an individual assaults, threatens, intimidates, or otherwise interferes with TSA screening personnel performing screening duties, the STSO must:

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A. Immediately notify an airport assigned LEO.

B. Provide a written summary of the incident to TSA management as soon as possible, but not to exceed 24 hours after the incident or as directed by the FSD. The summary must include the name, address, and all available flight information of the individual involved, and the name and address of any witness. The TSM or STSO writing the summary must attempt to obtain any supplemental reports, such as police reports regarding the incident, and attach them to the summary.

4.3.1. ARMED OR UNARMED LEOS ENTERING THE STERILE AREA

- A. An armed LEO or an **unarmed LEO accompanied by a working canine**, in or out of uniform, who desire passage beyond the screening checkpoint without screening of his or her person and accessible property must be discreetly referred to an airport assigned LEO (if available), an STSO, or a designated TSA representative for screening in accordance with the following procedures:
 - 1) An **on-duty** airport-assigned LEO, displaying a local distinctive airport ID may be cleared into the sterile area by a TSO without undergoing screening.
 - 2) An armed LEO may be cleared into the sterile area after inspection of his or her badge, credential, and U.S. Government-issued photo ID, and if flying, his or her boarding pass and Notice of LEO Flying Armed Document. For the purpose of this SOP, an LEO is considered armed when he or she is carrying a firearm or other item found on the TSA Prohibited Items List.
 - 3) An unarmed LEO, accompanied by a working canine, may be cleared into the sterile area after inspection of his or her badge, credential, and Government-issued photo ID, and if flying, his or her boarding pass.
- B. During inspection of the LEO documents, an airport-assigned LEO, STSO, or a designated TSA representative must ensure:
 - The name, flight, and date specified on an armed LEOs boarding pass and Notice of LEO Flying Armed document match.
 - 2) If the armed LEO is flying and does not present a Notice of LEO Flying Armed document, the LEO must be denied entry into the sterile area unless undergoing screening.
 - 3) If any of the documents do not appear to be valid, deny the individual access to the sterile area and contact an airport assigned LEO.
 - 4) If the boarding pass of an armed LEO **or an unarmed LEO with a working canine** is designated as a selectee, exempt that individual from selectee screening and apply distinctive markings to the individual's boarding pass to indicate that the individual is exempt from selectee screening.

4.3.2. UNARMED CANINE HANDLER ACCOMPANIED BY A WORKING CANINE

Unarmed, credentialed TSA employees or other airport-assigned security personnel accompanied by a TSA-certified working canine may be cleared into the sterile area using the following specialized screening procedures:

- A. An airport-assigned LEO (if available) or an STSO clears the individual after inspecting the TSA employee's credential or an FSD-approved credential of a non-TSA employee along with a Government-issued photo ID and if flying, the individual's boarding pass.
- B. The individual fills out and signs the applicable sections of the Screening Checkpoint Sign-in/LEO Log.

4.3.3. ARMED U.S. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

Armed, non-LEO BEP, NSA, or CIA POD employees may be cleared into the sterile area using the following specialized screening procedures: